Queer Theory: A Feminist Philosophical Commentary by Schott, Robin May
This piece was originally
presented as a commentary to Dag Heede’s
lecture, “En køn historie. Queer teori og
en ny mærkelig litteraturhistorie”, at the se-
minar “De skæve køn”. I am not a queer
theorist, but a feminist theorist who will
make some critical comments about queer
theory – criticisms that in part already have
been expressed by lesbian feminist writers
such as Suzanna Danuta Walters and Rose-
mary Hennessy. My task is not to discuss
Dag Heede’s literary interpretations, which
I take to be creative and interesting.
Rather, I will look at the conceptual
presuppositions to his claim that queer
theory is “a” or even “the” new philoso-
phical paradigm.
First let me begin with some personal
comments. When Dag Heede sent me his
lecture addressing me as a worthy oppo-
nent – strong, potent, beautiful and castra-
ting with a penetrating and phallic look –
well, I admit to being flattered. It was like
the birthday card I received years ago from
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a close friend of mine (a black, gay philo-
sopher, now deceased). On the front of the
card I read “To someone who is beautiful,
brilliant, classy, sexy...” and thoroughly
gratified I opened the card to read on the
inside, “You’re eating this up, aren’t you?”
Remembering this birthday card experi-
ence, I figured that I ought to pause to
think about the position in which Dag’s ad-
dress put me. In the opening of his lecture,
he sets up a playful teasing between sexed
bodies and gendered identities – a tension
that gets carried through in the lecture.
Who has the male body? He does. And
who has the male intellectual identity? I do.
Who has the female body? I do. Who has
the female intellectual identity? He does.
This teasing raises the serious question
about how to analyze and negotiate rela-
tions between sexed bodies and gendered
identities – a question to which I will re-
turn below. 
In this short piece, I am particularly in-
terested in looking at the discourse which
sets up queer theory as hip, fun, and trans-
gressive, while feminist theory is placed as
being angry, old-fashioned, and lacking sex
appeal. Dag Heede locates this narrative in
the popular perception of young people.
He notes that this narrative does, however,
reflect the entrenched cultural view that
men’s relations to men have more “drama,
desire, energy, publicness, and hullabaloo”
than women’s relation to women have.1
Nevertheless, he does not cast a critical eye
on this popular perception.
In what exactly does the newness of the
paradigm offered by queer theory consist?
Is it new because it generates critical views
about the practice of taking heterosexuality
as the norm for human sexual relations?
Heede notes that the commonality for
queers is minimally a critical attitude to he-
teronormativity.2
As a point of historical reference, I want
to point out that in 1976 the Brussels Tri-
bunal on Crimes against Women denoun-
ced compulsory heterosexuality as a crime
against women. And Adrienne Rich’s artic-
le, “Compulsory Heterosexuality and Les-
bian Existence”, published in Signs in
1980, defined heterosexuality as a political
institution that effects every aspect of our
professions, our curriculums, our social ar-
rangements (Rich 1980, 653, 657). So the
critique of heteronormativity, or of hetero-
sexual hegemony, is a central concept in fe-
minist theory. Judith Butler’s Gender Tro-
uble, published ten years after Rich’s article,
supplied a different theoretical framework
for the analysis of heteronormativity. But
Butler clearly situated her work as the con-
tinuation of a project within feminist philo-
sophy.
So if the newness of the queer paradigm
vis a vis feminist theory is not found in the
critique of hegemonic heterosexuality, is it
found in its queer’s openness and inclusive-
ness? Dag Heede notes that you do not
need to have sex with a person of the same
sex to identify as queer. He writes: “Queer
is fluid and diffuse.” (Incidentally, his
phrase echoes the words used by Rich to
describe lesbianism as a broad spectrum of
women-women relations (Rich 1980,
650).) Heede continues, queer can indicate
all sorts of “erotic and existential variations
which in some way depart from the norm
or normality.”3 And many so-called hetero-
sexuals identify themselves with the con-
cept of queer. In fact, after one semester
almost all of his students have become
queer.
I would like to raise a couple of questi-
ons to this open characterization of queer.
First is the question about the value and li-
mits of deviations. Queer theorists seem to
presume that all deviations from heteronor-
mativity are subversive. But are all forms of
subversions playful or emancipatory acts?
Do the deviations validated by queerness
include acts of incest and pedofilia? Such
acts are indeed subversive, but what they
subvert is the psychic health of boys who
become victims. These questions are rele-
vant to the public debates in the gay and
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lesbian movements in North America over
the status of the “North American Man-
Boy Association” (Walters 1996, 838).
Without further clarification, this come-ye-
all-to-me approach to queerness risks ma-
king the identification with queerness
either dangerous or meaningless, and hence
this approach undermines any claim that
queer theory makes about being subversive
of the institutions of heterosexuality. In-
stead, I might look for the subversion of
heteronormativity in practices that effec-
tively undermine the rampant sexualization
and objectification of women in advertising
and in the heinous modern slave trade in
women for prostitution.
Moreover, if queer really has nothing to
do with specific sexual practices, can one
criticize the phenomena appearing in the
U.S. of straight academics theoretically
“passing” as queer? The problem of “pas-
sing” is well-known in the U.S. with its his-
tory of racial discrimination. Many artists
(e.g., the philosopher-artist Adrian Piper)
have seathingly denounced the phenome-
non of racial “passing”, which not only ef-
fects a separation of physical from social
identity, but which allows persons who
“pass” to accrue benefits from their adopt-
ed identity at the price of deception and ali-
enation from their culture and community.
“Passing” as queer seems to work in the re-
verse direction: members of the privileged
group of heterosexuals adopt the identity
of the group that suffers discrimination.
But since academics are not entirely stupid,
this phenomena only occurs because it ac-
crues certain advantages, i.e, in getting the
theoretical limelight and promoting career
advancement. And of course, theoretical
queers (but practicing heterosexuals) do
not have to pay the price of struggling for
health insurance and adoption rights that
their gay and lesbian colleagues in the U.S.
have to pay. 
Dag Heede’s come-ye-all-to-me approa-
ch to queerness, with its implicit separation
between physical and social identity, also
raises the question of whether the specifici-
ty of bodies (e.g., sexual and racial differen-
ces) are relevant to queer theorists. If not,
then queer theory marks a dramatic depar-
ture from the analysis of bodies that has
been a central component of feminist theo-
ry. If the newness of queerness lies in this
split between physical and social identity,
then it is hardly an advance for social and
cultural theory.
The purportedly open-ended scope of
queerness is also troubling to a feminist
sensibility that has a fine-honed scepticism
about claims to inclusiveness in Western
culture (e.g., feminist philosophers have
contributed substantial critical analysis
about the inclusiveness of the concepts of
man, humanity, rationality.). This skepti-
cism leads me to wonder whether queer-
theory in fact gives primacy to gay male
identity and practices vis a vis lesbian iden-
tity and practices. This suspicion is height-
ened by Dag Heede’s not-so-subtle image-
ry of a strange new literary history which
turns the bottom of texts up in the air and
takes them from behind.4 This concern is
voiced by lesbian writers who see gay male
sex and its history becoming the model of
radical chic. Donna Minkowitz writing for
the Village Voice in 1992 lamented: “I
have a girfriend, not a transgressive erotic
world where I can do it with five strangers
in an evening, or suck off girl upon girl in
the darkness of the meat district.” (Walters
1996, 850) And I must confess, the fact
that male sexual desire is given primacy
over female sexual desire does not strike me
as a radically new creation of the late 20th
and early 21st century.
If the inclusiveness of the queer para-
digm can be problematized, is it the aesthe-
ticization of identity which constitutes its
major contribution? Dag Heede describes
queer as a festive oasis in the desert wande-
ring of compulsory heterosexuality,5 and
thereby underlines its aesthetic attraction.
An aestheticization of identity is evident in
the popular view that gender is performan-
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ce, a question of gender shopping. Here I
want to underline that Judith Butler has
disavowed the voluntaristic interpretation
of the concept of performativity that was
spawned by Gender Trouble. She noted in
an interview in Radical Philosophy in 1993:
“I felt that the popularization of Gender
Trouble, even though it was interesting cul-
turally to see what it tapped into, to see
what was out there, longing to be tapped
into – ended up being a terrible misrepre-
sentation of what I wanted to say!” (Os-
borne & Segal 1994, 3). That she is op-
posed to a voluntaristic interpretation of
performativity is evidenced in the difficul-
ties she has in trying to work through con-
cepts of agency, resignification and subver-
sion in Feminist Contentions and Bodies that
Matter. But perhaps the really interesting
question is whether Butler herself conti-
butes to a misreading of her work because
of the limitations of her own theory. Butler
treats the social as the discursive and does
not treat material relations that shape the
social order, with its distribution of wealth,
resources, and power (Hennessy, 1995,
153). The insufficient attention Butler
gives to institutional and historical analysis
may well contribute to the popular percep-
tion of gender identity as a strictly aesthetic
choice.
If it is the aestheticization of identity
that characterizes the contribution of queer
theory, what are its political ramifications?
Does it call for a coalition of all those who
seek to be “non-heterosexually-normative”?
If so, does this contribute to a mono-causal
analysis of subordination and subjectifica-
tion? Here I would like to underline that
feminist theory has over the last 20 years
undergone a profound and productive self-
critique, with the consequence that issues
of race, class, ethnicity, and nationality be-
come crucial in analyses of gender and
sexuality. Queer theory should learn from
feminism the importance of analyzing   qu-
eer practices in relation to these complex
factors of social identity. As Jacquelyn Zita
writes, “To construct a new field of queer
studies without addressing misogyny, gen-
der, male supremacy, race, and class as these
are differently experienced by a wide diver-
sity of female and male queers, is to seal the
happy marriage of gay and lesbian studies
with a Hallmark card and a Falwellian bles-
sing.”6
I would argue for a more modest placing
of queer theory than Dag Heede does. Qu-
eer is not “new”, as opposed to feminism’s
retro-character. It does not offer a new op-
tic through which to view the world that
displaces the previous optics of sexuality,
gender, race, class. But queer theorists like
Dag Heede do offer productive strategies
for reading texts in relation to the on-going
definitional crisis about the pair hetero-
sexual/homosexual, and for analyzing how
textual interpretations can de-stabilize the
economy of desire based on heteronormati-
vity7. This work deserves a place in the
academy because it makes new and compel-
ling textual interpretations, not because it
sells itself as the hottest new item in the in-
tellectual-erotic market-place.
Instead of viewing queer as the new pa-
radigm, I am more inclined to agree with
Suzanna Walters that we should look for a
“creative renegotiation of the relationship
between feminism and queer theory and
politics ....” (Walters 1996, 864) Feminism
takes as one of its goals the analysis of
the material realities that shape men’s and
women’s lives and put them sometimes
similarly at risk – but sometimes also very
differently at risk (think of the specific
oppression of women of Afghanistan under
the Taliban regime).8 Thus, feminist theory
does not try to understand sexuality as
separate from an analysis gender. It is one
thing for Dag Heede to tease with this
separation of sexed bodies and gendered
identities e.g., his male body/female iden-
tity, my female body/male identity. It is
quite another to presume that this playful-
ness counts as an intervention in the poli-
tical and institutional dimensions that pro-
QUEER THEORY 85
vide the frames in which men and women
live their lives. Queer theory needs feminist
theory. Jocular attempts to treat feminism
as the old maid who turns out really to ha-
ve been in drag the whole time, and who
requires solicitous but not serious treat-
ment, are sadly misguided. As Walters
writes: “a queer theory that posits feminism
(or lesbian theory) as the transcended ene-
my is a queer that will really be a drag.”
(Walters 1996, 866)
FODNOTER
1. Heede writes: “også fordi der i vores kultur nu
engang – på godt og ondt – er mere drama, begær,
energi, offentlighed og hurlumhei omkring mænds
relationer til mænd end om kvinders forhold til
kvinder.” “En køn historie”, p. 2.
2. Heede writes: “Man behøver altså ikke have sex
med en person af det samme køn for at identificere
sig som ‘queer’... Den fælles minimalplatform er
vel blot en kritisk indstilling til det, der med et fint
ord hedder ‘heteronormativiteten’....” Ibid., p. 5. 
3. Heede writes: “‘Queer’ betegner ikke længere
kun, udelukkende eller entydigt personer, der har
sex med personer af eget køn, det er en langt mere
flydende og diffus størrelse.... ‘queer’ kan, efter
min mening, betegne alle mulige erotiske og eksi-
stentielle varianter, der i en eller anden form afvi-
ger fra normen eller normaliteten” pp. 4-5.
4. Heede writes: “Jeg drømmer om en mærkelig
litteraturhistorie, der vender bunden i vejret på
teksterne og tager dem bagfra....” p. 7.
5. He writes: “Flere og flere personer med en så-
kaldt ‘heterosexuel’ praksis identificerer sig eller le-
ger med queer-begrebet som et eksperimentelt
frirum for identitetsprøvning eller måske blot en
festlig oase i normallivets tvangsheteroseksuelle ør-
kenvandring.” p. 5
6. Jacqueline Zita: “Gay and Lesbian Studies: Yet
Another Unhappy Marriage?”, p. 271, cited in
Walters, p. 864.
7. P.6, Heede refers to the methodological provo-
cation put forth by Eve Sedgwick in The Epistemo-
logy of the Closet.
8. See Mary Anne Franks: “Woman Does Not   
Exist: Fantasy, Otherness, and the Taliban Regime
in Afghanistan.”
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